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I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of a comprehensive new Act is much like the birth
of a baby; you are never sure exactly what you have until it is out. Act
Number 333 of 1972, the new "Juvenile Act,"' was approved by the
Legislature on December 6, 1972, and became effective on February
6, 1973. At this writing, there has been a ten-month "shakedown
* B.A. Amherst College; LL.B. Harvard Law School; Judge of Court of Common Pleas,
Philadelphia County, 1972-74; presently a partner in Abrahams & Loewenstein; Instructor,
Temple Law School.
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 50-101 to -103, -201, -301 to -337 (Supp. 1973).
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cruise" for the new legislatibn. Lawyers, judges, administrators and
probation officers have been working out the first problems of the
legislation. The major review lies ahead, as many of the emerging
controversies surrounding this legislation are just now making their
way into the appellate courts.
This writing is designed to outline some of the practical problems
that those of us working with the Act have discovered in the past ten
months. There obviously is a "Philadelphia" bias, as this writer has
been working in the Philadelphia courts, and has been assisted in this
article by comments from administrators, judges, district attorneys,
public defenders and private counsel working in the same forum.2
Unfortunately, the problems facing Philadelphia today have tended
to become the problems of other urban and suburban counties tomor-
row, as the wave of juvenile crime spreads and as the problems created
by increased volume confront all court systems. It is clear that working
within the scope of the new Juvenile Act will present challenges to
lawyers and non-lawyers confronted with it.
II. THE ACT..
A. Its Purposes.
It would be understandable to assume that a major piece of legisla-
tion affecting the well-being of juveniles would be devoid of political
influences. It is true that partisan interests did not enter into the
formulation of the new Juvenile Act. However, nothing goes through.
a legislature without some brand of political confrontation.
There are different schools of thought concerning the proper per-
spective for handling the problems of juvenile delinquency. A detailed
analysis of this aspect of the situation would not only consume the
space allotted for this article but would cover this entire issue and then
barely scratch the surface.
In brief, there are those who advocate what might be called the
2. The writer would like to especially thank the following for their assistance: Hon.
Frank J. Montemuro, Jr., Administrative Judge of the Family Court Division of the
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas; Dr. Leonard Rosengarten, Chief Deputy Court
Administrator for the Family Court Division; Stanley M. Hopson, Deputy Administrator
for the Juvenile Branch of the Family Court Division; Lewis P. Mitrano, Chief of the
Family Court Division of the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office; Jonathan Miller,
Chief, Family Court Division of the Defender Association of Philadelphia and Michael L.
Levy, former Chief of the Family Court Division of the Defender Association of Phila-
delphia.
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"social worker" approach to handling the problems of juvenile de-
linquency. This philosophy stresses the individual child, aiming for
deinstitutionalized and community based treatment, hopefully in the
home. Others take more of a "law enforcement" approach, pointing
out that the "children" coming before the court are involved in
shootings, stabbings, rapes, armed robberies and other violent crimes
at relatively young ages, and asking for a juvenile justice system that
can handle these youths without merely transferring them to the
adult system.
Much of the substantive portion of the Juvenile Act has evolved as
a compromise between the two philosophies. The statement of pur-
poses has not so evolved-it is a statement of the "social worker" view
of treatment of juveniles. 8 This is because the original draft of the
Juvenile Act was stamped with the influence of the State Department
of Welfare, which is on the "social worker" side of the philosophical
street, and prosecutors, many judges and others on the "law enforce-
ment" side concentrated more on substantive provisions than the state-
ment of principles in working for amendments to the draft.
Sections l(b)(1) and 1(b)(3)4 set forth the conflict. The Juvenile Act
talks in terms of preserving "the unity of the family" and working "in
a family environment" whenever possible.5 The problems come up
when determining when this is "possible." Especially in the urban
juvenile gang culture, it is precisely the lack of a strong home environ-
ment that results in the delinquent behavior in the first place. An
overwhelming number of the juveniles involved in serious crimes are
from large families with no father in the home and live in socio-
economically deprived areas where the principal source of income is
grants from the Department of Public Assistance.6 For many of these
children, it is clear that the family has little influence on his or her
behavior and development. The chief social structure for the child
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-101 (Supp. 1973).
4. Id. § l(b). This act shall be interpreted and construed as to effectuate the following
purposes:
(1) To preserve the unity of the family whenever possible and to provide for the
care, protection, and wholesome mental and physical development of children coming
within the provisions of this act ....
(3) To achieve the foregoing purposes in a family environment whenever possible,
separating the child from parents only when necessary for his welfare or in the in-
terests of public safety.
5. Id.
6. Of 10,824 children involved in delinquency cases in Philadelphia County in 1972,
only 4,949, or 45.7 per cent, were living at home with both natural parents; 8,842, or
35.5 per cent, were living with their mother only. See the 1972 Report, Family Court
Division, Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia.
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is that created by his peers. In the inner city, often this is the highly-
structured, para-military format of the teen-age gang. The "law en-
forcement" advocate would contend that to comply with the purpose
of the Juvenile Act "to provide for the care, protection and whole-
some mental and physical development of children coming within
the provisions of this Act ' 7 will make it impossible to also follow the
dictates of retaining the family environmen't. He would claim that an
institution far away from the troubled home environment is the only
hope to restructure the social outlook of the delinquent.
Another seemingly innocuous clause in the statement of purposes
stirs feelings among those working with the Juvenile Act. Section
l(b)(4) provides that the "constitutional and other legal rights" of
juveniles must be recognized and enforced.8
The only catch here is that the full enforcement of the rights of a
juvenile may get him killed. Especially for a gang-related juvenile or
a youth immersed in the drug culture, if he "beats the rap" and returns
to his community, he faces gang retaliation or more of the same drug
use. Defense counsel must consider whether to raise a motion to sup-
press a search that turned up a loaded "38" or 25 bags of heroin to
return his client to the street, when the mother is crying for help
because she has lost control of her son. The lawyers of the Defender
Association of Philadelphia believe that their responsibilities as law-
yers under the Code of Professional Responsibility require them to do
all that is possible to keep their clients out of institutions.9 In view of
the fact that this might not always be the best long-term result for
their clients, this issue does cause tension for the defenders. Other
counsel representing juveniles have the same problem, but to this
writer appear more willing to deviate from their strict legal responsi-
bility.10
This writer has vivid memories of one case in which three boys
were charged with severely beating a fellow-gang member. The beaten
boy wanted to get out of the gang and reneged on the de-initiation
ritual of having a "fair one" (fair fight). with everybody in the gang.
One offender was sent to an institution. A second was discharged due
7. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-101 (Supp. 1973).
8. Id.
9. Interview with Michael L. Levy, former Chief of the Family Court Division of the
Defender Association of Philadelphia, in Philadelphia, July 16, 1973; correspondance
from Jonathan Miller, Chief, Family Court Division, Defender Association of Philadelphia,
Nov. 20, 1973.
10. These attorneys who spoke with the writer had best remain nameless.
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to a case of memory failure on the part of the Commonwealth's
witnesses. The third boy was placed on probation. The boy in the
institution became an honor student there, learned how to play bass,
and is getting set for a job on his release. The boy who was discharged
is presently awaiting trial for attempted murder in a gang shooting.
The boy who was placed on probation Was shot five days later, lost
one eye and will be in a wheelchair for the rest' of his life.
B. Pretrial Detention
Traditionally, bail has not been set for juveniles in Pennsylvania.
A child usually has little in the way of independent resources, and the
decision has been whether or not to release him or her to his parents
or guardian. Issues dealt with in the new Juvenile Act concern when
a juvenile may be held, how long he or she may be held, and where he
'or she may be held.
1. Preventive Detention
Prior to the Juvenile Act, the leading case on the issue of when a
juvenile' could be heldin custody was Commonwealth ex rel. Sprowal
v. Hendrick.' The *court in Sprowal pointed out that juveniles
normally have only limited mobility and can be expected to be returned
for trial by their parents or guardians.12
The court also said:
Unlike an adult, however, a juvenile may be detained by the
juvenile court for reasons other than the necessity of guaranteeing
his presence at future proceedings. If a juvenile does not have a
home with his parents or other responsible party, or is in need of
protective custody, or is in need of psychiatric help or should have
psychological testing -and evaluation, he or she may be detained
for such protective purposes13
A usual case for the 'retention of a juvenile is the situation whereby
the parents or guardian refuse to take the child home, either because
11. 438 Pa. 435, 265 A.2d 348 (1970).
12. Id. at 438, 265 A.2d at 349.
13. Id. at 438-39, 265 A.2d at 349. The Sprowal court added that the detention must be
tailored to the justification so that detention for the purpose of administering test would
be impermissible if the tests could be administered on an out-patient basis.
190
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they cannot control the child or believe that the child would be in real
danger on the streets.
The law was not, however, settled with respect to other circum-
stances. One question that frequently arose was the quantum of proof
necessary before a child could be held in custody, particularly in
circumstances where a juvenile was charged with a very serious crime
but had no record of failures to appear at court hearings. On some
occasions juveniles were held for the same reason that high bail would
be set for adults, i.e., that because of the serious nature of the charge
and the likelihood of incarceration if convicted, there was a serious
risk of flight. In other instances, although there was no specific indica-
tion that rival gang members were "out to get" the defendant and
although the parents were willing to take the risk of having their son
home, juveniles were held because the record indicated that the offense
was part of an on-going gang war in the inner city and from that it
was presumed that he would be in danger back on the street.
Prior to the new Juvenile Act, the greatest controversy regarding
detention was over the meaning of the term "protective custody,"
which was used in the Sprowal decision. 14 Who was to be protected?
Was it the offender himself who might be the victim of retaliation?
Or, if the youth charged had a record for a series of offenses, could the
community be protected from him under the "protective custody" lan-
guage in the decision?
This was resolved by section 12 of the new Juvenile Act,15 which
allows preventive detention when it is decided there is a risk to the
community from the juvenile. This section provides as follows:
Detention of Child. A child taken into custody shall not be
detained or placed in shelter care prior to the hearing on the
petition unless his detention or care is required to protect the
person or property of others or of the child or because the child
may abscond or be removed from the jurisdiction of the court or
because he has no parent, guardian, or custodian or other person
able to provide supervision and care for him and return him to
the court when required, or an order for his detention or shelter
care has been made by the court pursuant to this act.16
It is now clear that the legislature has provided that a juvenile can
14. Id. at 459, 265 A.2d at 349.
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-309 (Supp. 1973).
16. Id.
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be detained "to protect the person or property of others."17 It also
seems clear that this provision will be tested in the appellate courts.
There have been several problems in framing the issue for appeal. On
the one hand, often a juvenile being held because he is a risk to others
is also being detained because his parents cannot or will not take him
home-because he himself faces grave risks if returned to the com-
munity, or because there is a good chance that he will not return for
trial. Also, since the trials are now coming up so quickly,"' the point
often rapidly becomes moot, since the juvenile is either adjudicated
delinquent or discharged within ten days of the decision to hold him
in custody. At some point in time, the issue will be presented as to
whether it is constitutional to hold a seventeen-year-old who has been
involved in a gang slaying or stolen a number of cars when an eighteen-
year-old co-defendant must be released on bail. It is noted, however,
that for adults probation or parole violations often result in detainers
being lodged. This is not the practice in juvenile court. Therefore,
issues arise over repeat offenders who are juveniles which might not
arise if adults were involved.
2. How Long a Juvenile May Be Held
Although section 12 expanded the grounds upon which a juvenile
may be held and in so doing appealed to the "law enforcement" advo-
cates, what section 12 gave, section 18(a) took away. Section 18(a)
provides:
Section 18. Summons. (a) After the petition has been filed the
court shall fix a time for hearing thereon, which, if the child is
in detention, shall not be later than ten days after the filing of the
petition. If the hearing is not held within such time, the child
shall be immediately released from detention .... 19
This section can be read to provide for mandatory release whenever
the hearing cannot be held within ten days. It is argued that the juve-
nile then must be released even if there is no one to take him home, or
if it appears he will flee and not return for trial, or if his life is in
danger, and/or if he is likely to victimize someone else. Some argue
that this section applies even if the necessity to continue the case
arises without fault on the part of the Commonwealth.
17. Id.
18. See text section B(2) infra.
19. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-315 (Supp. 1973).
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This writer already has personal knowledge of a situation which
questions the wisdom of this interpretation of the section more than
the most drastic hypothetical situation propounded by the "law en-
forcement" advocates. A boy stabbed another as part of a gang-war
grudge and was sent to a juvenile institution for the offense. When he
was released from the institution, he went after the same boy again,
this time shooting him and wounding him critically. The shooter was
held at his detention hearing because of his dangerous proclivities. At
the hearing ten days later, the victim was still in the intensive care
unit of a hospital in serious condition and unable to appear. When
the district attorney asked for a continuance, defense counsel moved
for the defendant's release under section 18(a). This writer continued
the hearing for an additional ten days on the grounds that it is per-
missible to continue detention for that period when circumstances
beyond the control of the Commonwealth necessitated the continuance
and there is a strong need for continued detention within the frame-
work of section 12.
Because of practical considerations, this issue has been slow to reach
the appellate courts. Both the district attorney's office and the public
defenders (who handle the bulk of Philadelphia's juvenile cases) are
aware of the adage that "hard cases make bad law." Both want a case
that has a desirable factual situation for their legal appeal. Thus, in
the case of the boy who assaulted another twice, the public defender
is reluctant to have this case as the test case. In other circumstances,
where the danger to the community is not so clear-cut, and an unex-
plained failure to appear on the part of a Commonwealth witness
necessitates the continuance, the district attorney will consent to the
release from custody at the time of the ten-day hearing. Also, if the
juvenile is detained for only ten more days, often the case will be
finally determined before an appeal of the pre-trial detention can be
fully perfected.
It is surprising to note that, in general, the office of the district at-
torney is pleased with the ten-day rule, and that the rule causes prob-
lems for defense counsel. 20 The Commonwealth has generally com-
pleted most of its investigation by the time the arrest is made and is
ready for trial. The victim and key witnesses are known and have been
interviewed by the police. Evidence has been seized. Moreover, it is
20. Interviews with Lewis P. Mitrano, Chief of the Family Court Division of the Phila-
delphia District Attorney's office, and Michael L. Levy, former Chief of the Family Court
Division of the Defender Association of Philadelphia, in Philadelphia, July 25, 1973.
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easier to get witnesses to court ten days after the event. There is less
likelihood that they would have moved, and the crime is still fresh in
their minds. They are still angered by the event and more willing to
appear to testify. For these reasons they make better witnesses.21
The defense, on the other hand, has just begun to find out what the
case is about. They have an interview with their client, which may or
may not be candid and detailed. Defense counsel needs time to ascer-
tain, locate and subpoena witnesses. Defense lawyers are often faced
with a dilemma: they are not quite ready to proceed, but a request for
a continuance will result in their client's remaining in custody for a
number of days longer. The defense bar generally would prefer to
have the ten-day rule changed to a fifteen-day or twenty-day rule.22
The ten-day rule creates some difficulties for the court administra-
tion and other supportive staff. Schedules for court can. no longer be
made up far in advance. Subpoenas for witnesses must be prepared in
a hurry, and there is pressure on the sheriffs or district attorney detec-
tives who serve the subpoenas. However, these administrative problems
are being managed.23
It is suggested that remedial legislation would be desirable to: (1)
spell out those circumstances when a juvenile may be detained longer
than ten days; and (2) extend the ten day hearing to fifteen or twenty
days.
3. Where a Juvenile May Be Detained
Section 14(4) of the new Juvenile Act provides that no juvenile may
be detained in any facility with adults unless there is no appropriate
facility available.2 4 If no appropriate facility is available, the juveniles
may be kept in the same facility with adults, but shall be kept separate
and apart from the adults and shall under no circumstances be de-
tained there for more than five days. 25
This certainly is a desirable end. Unfortunately, the separate facili-
ties just do not exist at the moment. Approximately 100 juveniles in
Philadelphia are housed in two cell blocks at the House of Correction.
21. Id.
22. Interview with Michael L. Levy, former Chief of the Family Court Division of the
Defender Association of Philadelphia, in Philadelphia, July 16, 1973.
23. Interview with Stanley M. Hopson, Deputy Administrator for the Juvenile Branch
of the Family Court Division of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, in Philadelphia,
July 2, 1973.
24. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-311(a)(4) (Supp. 1973).
25. Id.
194
Vol. 12: 186, 1973
The New Juvenile Act
The facility'is circular, with the cell blocks serving as the spokes of a
wheel. There is a certain amount of mixing when the juveniles pass
through the central core to move for meals, classes, recreation, etc. In
many'other counties, there is not a sufficient volume of juvenile cases
to justify construction of a separate facility.
In Philadelphia, juveniles are still being housed in the House of
Correction despite section 14(4) of the new Juvenile Act. There may be
some reluctance on the part of defense counsel to press too rapidly on
this issue, because if they are successful, the result in Philadelphia may
be a massive overcrowding at the Youth Study Center, where the
younger juveniles (under sixteen) are housed. Also, Senate Bill No.
125 would postpone the effective date of this-provision of the Juvenile
Act until December 31, 1974.26 County governments, particularly in
fiscally hard-pressed areas such as Philadelphia and Allegheny coun-
ties, would have been less reluctant to accept the state mandate to con-
struct new juvenile detention facilities if the state had also appro-
priated the funds to pay for this construction.
There may be some argument that juveniles are not really detained
in a facility "with" adults2 7 when they are in a separate cell block. In
Philadelphia, the wings of the House of Correction used for juveniles
are called by a different name, Pennypack House, although from time
to time'different wings are so designated as juveniles are shifted from
one cell block to another' Since there is some mixing in these jointly-
used facilities, and the Juvenile Act does make provision for five-day
placement in a jointly-used facility if juveniles are kept separate from
the adults,28 it appears that juveniles are "with" adults if they are in
the-same building.
This writer is not aware of any reason why the time fixed for hold-
ing a hearing if a juvenile is- detained is ten days, but the time the
juvenile may be' held in the facility is only five days. It would appear
that at least the two time limits should be the same. Moreover, if the
facilities do not exist when the juvenile is first committed, they are
not going to be constructed five days later. Again there is a conflict that
develops internally in the new Juvenile Act between section 12, which
describes the circumstances when it would be harmful to a juvenile
or the community if he were released, and other sections which appear
to provide for mandatory release into these harmful situations.
26. Pa. S. 125, 1st Sess. § 14(A)(4) (1973).
27. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-311 (Supp. 1973).
28. Id.
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Almost everybody agrees that juveniles should not be detained with
adults prior to trial. This writer is aware of arguments, dating back
more than six years, against the mixed detention of juveniles and
adults, and the advocacy of separate juvenile detention probably
started many years before that. It is one thing to support a principle,
however, and another to come up with the money to turn the principle
into reality. Hopefully, the goal can somehow be met in the not too
distant future. The new Juvenile Act may provide the incentive.
C. Jurisdiction of the Court
The new Juvenile Act continues the carefully established distinc-
tions between what is and what is not to be the subject of juvenile
court proceedings. 29 And, as was the case under prior law, counsel and
the courts often bend this framework when the interests of justice and
the welfare of the juvenile before the bar of the court so require.
The "separateness" of juvenile court proceedings has become less
significant as judges are shifted in and out of that assignment. In the
smaller counties, there are not enough juvenile cases to occupy one
judge full-time, so the juvenile judge will hear other matters. In Phila-
delphia, only six of twenty Family Court Division judges will be as-
signed to juvenile work at one time, and judges of that division will be
rotated between juvenile court, Domestic Relations and Trial Division
work.
Sometimes this leads to somewhat strange results. This writer pre-
sided over a case involving one boy where both the adult and the
juvenile systems became involved. The boy was having troubles on
probation, and was to go into the Marines as a condition of further
probation. This writer released the boy to the custody of a minister
for the five day period before his enlistment. Over that time, he was
arrested for breaking into the coin box of an apartment house washing
machine. He lost his chance to go into the Marines, and was in custody
for some time until the district attorney and defense counsel agreed
to a placement at a Youth Development Center. However, he could
not go because the coin box case had been transferred to adult court.
Although the district attorney had no objection to the juvenile dis-
position, there were great practical difficulties in locating the paper-
work to effectuate this, since two different jurisdictions were involved
29. Id. § 50-103.
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-Family Division and Trial Division. Meanwhile, this writer was
transferred to Trial Division on the general felony list for two months.
Bucking all percentages, the boy's coin box case came up on that list.
Although this facilitated the ultimate disposition, it was not without
a good deal of surprise on the part of the boy who thought he left one
judge behind in juvenile court only to find he drew him again in his
adult case.
The jurisdictional problems have taken on some new ramifications,
not only because of the new Juvenile Act, but also because of other
recent developments in the law.
1. Summary Offenses
The jurisdictional aspects of the new Juvenile Act are partially set
forth in section 2 under "Definitions."8 0 In this section, it is specifically
provided that summary offenses do not constitute "delinquent acts."$1
The juvenile Act then goes on to provide that (unless a child is de-
prived) there is no jurisdiction under the Juvenile Act unless he is
alleged to be delinquent.32 He must first commit a delinquent act be-
fore he can be considered to be a "delinquent child."831 Thus it seems
fairly clear that if a juvenile commits only a summary offense, he can-
not be prosecuted in the juvenile court system.
However, section 7 of the Juvenile Act,34 dealing with the transfer
of cases from adult court to juvenile court, provides that in a "criminal
proceeding" other than murder, if it is discovered that the defendant
is a child (under eighteen),85 the judge shall "forthwith halt further
criminal proceedings, and, where appropriate, transfer the case to the
[juvenile court]."38
It is therefore being argued by defense counsel that there is no
jurisdiction anywhere for juveniles charged with summary offenses.
The summary offenses are not delinquent acts under the Juvenile
Act,37 and the juveniles cannot be tried in adult court if summary of-
fenses are to be treated as "criminal proceedings." This conflict has
become relatively more significant in counties not plagued with serious
30. Id. § 50-102.
31. Id. § 50-102(2)(ii).
32. Id. 6 50-03.
33. Id. § 50-102(3).
34. Id. 3 50-303.
35. Id. 50o102(l).
36. Id. 5 50-303.
37. Id. 50-102(2).
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juvenile crime, since the problems, of housing juveniles with adults,
bringing cases to trial within ten days, and other difficulties concerned
with serious crimes are not as pronounced in those jurisdictions. 8
This possible lack of jurisdiction becomes especially incongruous
when it is noted that one of the summary offenses is underage drink-
ing,89 which eventually will probably apply only to those under 18
and thus in the juvenile court jurisdiction. It would seem strange for
the legislature to create a crime for which there would be no forum.
The alternative is to try juveniles charged with summary offenses
in the same manner as adults would be tried for summary offenses. A
number of summary offenses are crimes with which juveniles are
commonly charged. These offenses include disorderly conduct,40 harass-
ment,41 criminal mischief where the damage is under $500,42 and a
first retail theft where the dollar value involved is less than $100. 4 3
These offenses can carry sentences of up to ninety days in jail. Since
the conviction for the summary offense would not be under the Juve-
nile Act, it appears that the juvenile could be committed to an adult
institution for three months for the summary offense. As is discussed
in section F7 of this article, section 27 of the-new'Juvenile Act pro-
hibits the commitment of juveniles adjudged delinquent to facilities
used primarily for the execution of sentences of adults convicted- of a
crime.44 Thus, a juvenile found delinquent for rape or attempted
murder could not be sent to the standard county prison while a juve-
nile convicted for underage drinking could be.
As a practical matter, many defense counsel are waiving this jurisdic-
tional problem and allowing the summary offense'to be -tried in juve-
nile court. Obviously, there isra.question as to whether the waiver-of
jurisdiction is valid. Nonetheless, a consent decree (pre-trial probation
-- see discussion in section II. D3 of this -article) or regular juvenile
probation often seems better to defense :counsel than having their
clients released from juvenile court and rearrested and booked with
the drunks and other adults charged with summary offenses at the
police district. Also, Senate Bill No.. '125 would eliminate this problem,
38. Interviews with Lewis P. Mitra'no, Chief of the Family Court Division of the Phila-
delphia District Attorney's office, and Michael L. Levy, former Chief of the Family Court
Division of the Defender Association of Philadelphia, in Philadelphia, July 25, 1973.
39. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 6308 (1973).
40. Id. § 5503.
41. Id. § 2709.
42. Id. § 3304.
43. Id. § 3929.
44. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-324 (Supp. 1973).
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as it would define delinquent act to exclude only summary offenses
under the Vehicle Code,45 not all summary offenses.46
2. Murder
Section 2(2) of the Juvenile Act preserves the prior law by specifi-
cally excluding murder from the definition of "delinquent act."47 To-
day, however, as'in the past, murder cases are still being tried in juvenile
court. They are tried in juvenile court merely by calling the offense
"unlawful killing" instead of "murder." Unlawful killings are not mur-
der if they are voluntary manslaughter or involuntary manslaughter.
Under the practice in juvenile court, however, even some offenses
which technically rise to the level of murder are considered unlawful
killing. The decision in this matter is often made by the district at-
torney, who can proceed on a murder bill of indictment or merely
ask for prosecution of the "unlawful killing." The kinds of cases which
proceed in this fashion involve defendants who may have been only
tangentially involved in a gang killing, or young juveniles with little
prior contact with juvenile court involved in an unpremeditated kill-
ing, and other situations where it appears that a final disposition to a
delinquent institution is more in order than adult imprisonment.
By tradition, murder cases in Philadelphia have been preliminarily
tried by a Family Division judge who sits as a committing magistrate
for the preliminary hearing. If there is no prima facie case of murder
but there is a prima facie case of manslaughter, the matter is then in
juvenile court for disposition of the "unlawful killing." If there is a
prima facie case of murder, the matter then proceeds to the grand jury.
There has been a change in Philadelphia procedure with respect to
the processing of juveniles, but this change was not occasioned by the
new Juvenile Act. Until the summer of 1973, juveniles charged with
murder would be processed as other juveniles through the Juvenile
Aid Division officers of the police department and the Youth Study
Center. They would only be turned over to the adult court after the
preliminary hearing. Today, the processing of all murder suspects takes
place in the Police Administration Building in the same manner. The
reason for this is the necessity for an immediate preliminary arraign-
45. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, §§ 101-2521 (1970); id. § 3001-13 (Supp. 1973).
46. Pa. S. 125, 1st Sess. § 2(2) (1973).
47. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-102(2) (Supp. 1973).
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ment. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Futch48
and Commonwealth v. Tingle,4 9 held that if an immediate preliminary
arraignment is not held, any statement made by a defendant after the
time he should have had his preliminary arraignment must be sup-
pressed. Because of the time spent in waiting for Juvenile Aid Division
officers to interview juveniles and in the time spent in transportation
to and processing at Philadelphia's Youth Study Center, the mechanics
of processing prevents the police from having enough time to conduct
an interview of the juvenile. It has therefore been necessary to process
all juveniles charged with murder as adults to allow time for ques-
tioning.50
3. Need for Treatment, Rehabilitation and Supervision
A distinction is made in the definitional section of the Juvenile Act
between a "delinquent act" 51 and a "delinquent child."52 A "delin-
quent child" not only must have committed a delinquent act, but also
must be "in need of treatment, supervision or rehabilitation."53
Section 23(b) of the Juvenile Act 54 provides that after a finding of
guilt on the facts, the court then or at a continued hearing, should hear
evidence to determine whether the child is "in need of treatment,
supervision or rehabilitation and to make and file its findings thereon."
If the act charged constitutes a felony, this in itself is sufficient to indi-
cate the need for treatment, supervision or rehabilitation.55 However,
if the act is a misdemeanor, the additional finding is necessary even to
justify probation; and if there is no finding of such a need, the child
must be discharged from any detention or restriction. 5
This change has produced only a small effect. It has been raised by
defense counsel from time to time but considering the broad language
involved and the total absence of guidelines, it is possible to find
almost any youngster in need of "treatment, supervision or rehabilita-
tion."57 Often a child's school record will be considered. In Philadel-
48. 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d 417 (1972).
49. 451 Pa. 241, 301 A.2d 701 (1973).
50. Interview with Lewis P. Mitrano, Chief of the Family Court Division of the Phila-
delphia District Attorney's Office, in Philadelphia, May 27, 1973.
51. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-102(2) (Supp. 1975).
52. Id. § 50-102(3).
53. Id.
54. Id. § 50-20(b).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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phia, the Board of Education places representatives in each juvenile
courtroom to provide up-to-date records on attendance and behavior.
Many of the juveniles coming before the Philadelphia courts are from
large families where there is no father in the home.58 This can be used
as an indication that there is a need for supervision. It is still hard to
get away from the concept that if a child goes out and steals a car,
there is something bothering him and that this alone would at least
justify placing him on probation.
There is no question that there is a likelihood of appellate litigation
to clarify and amplify this section.
4. Transfer to Adult Court
Because the new Juvenile Act tends to adopt the "social worker"
theory of juvenile justice somewhat more than past practices, and be-
cause of uncertainty and difficulties for the Commonwealth in some
other areas (ten day rule, detaining juveniles with adults, etc.), the
district attorney has been more frequently requesting that the juvenile
be tried as an adult. This is effected through what used to be called a
"certification" hearing and is now a "transfer" hearing. The procedure
is set forth in section 28 of the Juvenile Act.59
There has been considerable litigation involving the procedures that
must be followed before a juvenile can be tried as an adult. One of
the half dozen most important United States Supreme Court cases in-
volving the juvenile process, Kent v. United States,60 dealt with this
issue. Mr. Justice Fortas, speaking for the majority, said that before a
juvenile could be tried as an adult, he is "entitled to a hearing, in-
cluding access by his counsel to the social records and probation or
similar reports which presumably were considered by the court, and
to a statement of reasons for the Juvenile Court's decision. We believe
that this result is required by the statute read in the context of con-
stitutional principles relating to due process and the assistance of
counsel." 1
The practice prior to the new Juvenile Act was well outlined by
Allegheny County Judge Maurice B. Cohill, Jr., who described the
procedure in certification hearings as follows:
58. See note 6 supra.
59. PA. STAT. ANN. Ht 11, § 50-325 (Supp. 1973).
60. 383 US. 541 (1966).
61. Id. at 557.
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This has been construed by most as requiring the judge to sit
first as a committing magistrate; the Commonwealth must present
a prima facie case. Following this presentation, there is usually a
motion from the representative of the district attorney (if one is
present) for certification. The court then considers: the past
delinquent history of the juvenile; his maturity; the previous
disposition by the court of cases involving the juvenile; whether
he is amenable to rehabilitation under facilities available to the
juvenile court; whether he allegedly was involved with adult co-
defendants; and whether the interests of justice would better be
served by a jury trial-jury trials presently being prohibited by the
Pennsylvania Juvenile Court Act.62
On the whole, section 28 of the new Juvenile Act codifies prior pro-
cedure. It provides for a hearing with notice in writing three days prior
to the hearing that transfer will be requested.63 The Juvenile Act sets
fourteen as the minimum age before there can be transfer to adult
courts. 4 Of course, a prima facie case must be first made out.65 There
are three requirements which must be met before a juvenile may be
transferred to adult court: (1) he must not be amenable to treatment,
supervision or rehabilitation as a juvenile through available facilities;
(2) he should not require commitment to an institution for the men-
tally retarded or mentally ill; and (3) either the crime must carry a
sentence of more than-three years, or the interests of the community
require that he be placed under legal restraint or discipline. 66
The Juvenile Act spells out that in making the determination, "the
court may consider age, mental capacity, maturity, previous record and
probation or institutional reports." 67 It does not provide for the pro-
cedural aspects considered in the past, e.g., whether a jury trial is de-
sirable or whether there are adult co-defendants so that a joint trial
could be effected. If the crime carries a maximum penalty of less than
three years, the test of whether the interests of the community require
legal restraint or discipline is so broad as to almost be a non-test.
Another problem arises because the fate of Camp Hill as a juvenile
institution is in doubt.68 The Juvenile Act speaks in terms of the child
62. Cohill, The United States Supreme Court and Juvenile Courts-An Overview, 9
DUQ. L. REv. 573, 574 (1970).
63. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 50-325(a)(2), (3) (Supp. 1973).
64. Id. § 50-325(a)(1).
65. Id. § 50-325(a)(4).
66. Id. §§ 50-325(a)(4)(i)-(iii).
67. Id. § 50-325(a)(4)(i).
68. See text section II(F)(5) infra.
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being amenable to treatment in "available facilities." 69 With the ex-
ception of Camp Hill, all of the Pennsylvania facilities are in open or
non-secure settings. If a child has a tendency to run away from institu-
tions such as the Youth Development Centers, is this enough to, have
him transferred to adult court?
The Juvenile Act does not require a written or specific statement
of the reasons for the transfer if that is the decision of the court, al-
though that is required under Kent v. United States.70 A practical
problem can arise in this regard. Sometimes the reasons for the transfer
are made obvious in the argument on transfer from the comments of
the district attorney and defense counsel and the response of the
judge. This is not often transcribed by the court reporter, however,
and there is a danger that the statement of reasons for transfer may not
find their way into the record.
The new law seems as flexible as the old. What remains to be seen
is how much more often the district attorney will request transfer,
and how much more often itwill be granted. The question seems to be
less one of the parameters of the law than the practice as it will
develop.
5. Transfer from Adult Court to Juvenile Court
There are a surprising number of circumstances where a juvenile is
charged as an adult and starts proceeding through the stages of adult
prosecution. There are several possible reasons for this. The juveniles
often say that when the police pick them up they do not believe them
when they state their age as under eighteen and for that reason they
are booked as adults. On other occasions, a juvenile may have an ex-
tensive record, and may be on probation or be a runaway from an
institution. This juvenile will give a false name and give his age as
over eighteen in the hopes that when his, adult case comes up, he will
be treated as a "first offender" and wind up on probation, rather than
being sent to a juvenile institution.
Section 7 of the new Juvenile Act covers this situation and provides
that if it is discovered in a non-murder case that the defendant is under
eighteen, the judge shall halt the criminal proceedings and send the
69. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-325(a)(4) (Supp. 1973) (emphasis added).
70. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
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case to the Family Court Division (or the judge assigned to juvenile
cases).71
The question that remains is how far a trial has to go before a judge
no longer has to transfer the case back to juvenile court. What if the
defendant is already serving his sentence? What if the defendant was
found guilty, but post-trial motions had not yet been argued? What if
post-trial motions were argued, but no sentence had yet been imposed
and the information was discovered in the assembling of the pre-sen-
tence report? The Juvenile Act provides clues, but they are somewhat
contradictory. Section 7 provides that the judge must halt an adult
trial "if it appears to the court in a criminal proceeding . . ." that
the defendant is under eighteen.72 If the proceeding is over, it could be
argued that the transfer is no longer necessary. There still remains the
question of when the proceeding is over. Also, the section talks of
transferring papers and documents to the juvenile court, and speaks
specifically of transferring "transcripts of testimony relating to the
case."73 This may mean that the legislature contemplated a transfer to
juvenile court even when the testimony was closed and the discovery
that the defendant was a juvenile came after verdict. Since section 28
provides for transfer, in the discretion of the court, to adult court
when the juvenile requests it,74 the failure to complain of adult pro-
ceeding may be treated as such a request.
Section 7 further provides that if a child is tried for murder and
convicted of a lesser offense, the case may be transferred to juvenile
court for disposition.7 There is no provision in the Juvenile Act for
transfer back to juvenile court for disposition in non-murder cases if
the judge in the adult court thinks it appropriate. Young adults, how-
ever, can be committed to Camp Hill under a specific statute.7 8 If there
was an -initial justification for the transfer, a less severe commitment
will not often be in order. Moreover, such a return to juvenile court
can be obtained even without statutory provision with the consent of
the district attorney. This can be arranged through a nol process of
the adult Bills of Indictment and a reinstitution of the juvenile peti-
tion.
71. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-309 (Supp. 1973).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. § 50-325(c).
75. Id. § 50-303.
76. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61 § 483 (1964).
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6. Inter-County Transfers
Section 9 of the new Juvenile Act provides that venue lies in the
county of residence as well as in the county where the offense was
committed.7 7 Section 10 provides for transfer from one county to
another.78 This is a reenactment of prior law.79
There are two practical effects of this. Generally, more cases are
transferred from suburban counties to the urban court system than
vice versa. This adds to the backlog and to the expenses of the hard-
pressed urban system. It also creates problems in obtaining witnesses
from the suburbs who are not well disposed to lose a day's pay and
come into the center of the large city.
D. Pre-Trial Screening
1. Cases Screened Before Coming to Court
In Philadelphia, there are many stages at which a case can "fall out"
of the juvenile justice system before it reaches court.Philadelphia has established an effective Counseling and Referral
Service which deals with family problems even prior to arrest. Refer-
rals are often made from school and community. The philosophy is to
stop serious delinquency before it starts and to work with the whole
family.
Many cases are adjusted at the police station and not sent beyond
there. A report will be made of the arrest by the juvenile aid officer,
but it will be marked adjusted and the juvenile released.
In Philadelphia, before a case gets to court, a hearing is held before
a probation officer at the juvenile detention facility, the Youth Study
Center. The complainants are invited and the police reports are avail-
able. A great number of cases fall out at this level, either because the
offense appears minimal, because there is no long history of delinquent
behavior, or because there seems to be adequate supervision in the
home.
The procedures that have been in effect for some time in Philadel-
phia are now formally sanctioned and adopted by the Juvenile Act.
77. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-306 (Supp. 1973).
78. Id. § 50-307.
79. Act of June 2, 1933, Pa. P.L 1433, § 11.
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Section 8 provides for informal adjustment, which contemplates both
referrals to social agencies (like the Counseling and Referral Service)
and adjustment without adjudication."0
2. Pre-Trial Court Lists
In Philadelphia there is another procedure that is nowhere 'pre-
scribed by statute but is most effective in 'disposing of cases without
full hearings. This is the Pre-Trial Court List (pre-trial). 1 .
The pre-trial is not merely a conference. It is set formally in a
courtroom with a judge on the bench wearing a robe. The assistant
district attorney reads the police report,. and an attempt is made to
reach an agreement on the case without subpoenaing witnesses. Cases
can be withdrawn if it appears that the Commonwealth does not have
enough legally admissible evidence to make out a prima facie case. The
juvenile can be placed on a Consent Decree, whereby he is placed on
probation without trial.8 2 There can be an admission to the offense.
Generally, as a "rule of the game,". a juvenile will not be institution-
alized at the pre-trial level unless it is agreed to by the defense counsel.
This might occur if- it is obvious that the youth will be committed for
other reasons (runaway, probation violations) or. if the defense counsel
believes that the juvenile might be sent to a harsher institution after a
full hearing..
The pre-trial also serves to provide discovery for the defense and to
ascertain whether or not the juvenile has counsel. If it appears that the
case cani be resolved at the pre-trial level, the voluntary defender in the
courtroom will often be appointed only .for the pre-trial in order to
attempt to resolve the matter there. Since there is no preliminary
hearing in juvenile court, the pre-trial is valuable for defense counsel
because the highlights of the Commonwealth's case from the police
report are read into the record. Also, defense counsel can obtain the
Notes of Interview from the conference held at the Youth Study
Center. If the case must go to trial, a full colloquy is held to determine
whether the defendant qualifies for free counsel. It is also ascertained
whether or 'not there is a conflict between-,co-defendants which -would
require the appointment of different counsel for one or more of the
parties.
80. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-304 (Supp. 1973).
81. The Pre-Trial Court List will hereinafter be referred' to as pre-trial.
82. See text section 1I(D)(3) infra.
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To this writer, it appears that pre-trial works, and works well. It
seems it would also work well in juvenile courts throughout the state.
Perhaps it should be expanded into adult criminal trials. It is difficult
to ascertain why the results are so much better than civil pre-trial con-
ferences. Although it is only a guess, it is suggested that the formality
of the hearing, being held in a courtroom with a judge wearing a robe,
psychologically influences counsel and encourages them to work on a
meaningful resolution of the case before them.
3. Consent Decree
Section 8.1 of the new Juvenile Act, entitled "Consent decree, ' ' s3
creates another "new" procedure that in fact has been around for a
long while, although totally without any statutory or other formal
authorization. This new section allows for pretrial probation simi-
lar to the "Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition" program available
to adults.8 4 Prior to the juvenile Act, Philadelphia judges had adopted
a practice of marking a case "determined," entering neither a find-
ing of not guilty nor an adjudication of delinquency. Supervision
was supplied under the term "Friendly Service Supervision" (FSS).
The same probation officers dealing with juveniles on juvenile proba-
tion serviced the people on FSS although they did see the FSS juveniles
much less frequently.
Under section 8.1 either the district attorney or the child can move
to suspend the court proceedings and continue the child under super-
vision in his own home, with such conditions as are negotiated. 5 If
the child objects, the court must proceed to findings, adjudication and
disposition. If, however, it is the district attorney who objects, th6
court can still enter an unconsented-to "consent" decree.,
The probation is for a period of six months. It can be extended for
an additional six months by the probation services if the application
is made "before expiration. of the'six-month period."87 There are
problems looming from this provision. This writer has seen a number
of requests for extension of the consent decree probation that have
been filed after the six months have elapsed, due to the heavy case-
loads of some probation officers.
83. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-305 (Supp. 1973).
84. PA. R. CRiM. P. 175-85.
85. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-305(a) (Supp. 1973).
86. Id. § 50-305(b).
87. PA. R. CRIM. P. 175-85.
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The Juvenile Act also provides, however, that if a new petition is
filed alleging a delinquent act during the consent decree probation
period, or if a child otherwise fails to comply with the terms of proba-
tion, in the discretion of the district attorney, after consulting with
the probation department, the petition can be reinstated and the child
tried as if no consent decree had ever been imposed.88 In this circum-
stance, negotiations could result in an extension of the consent decree
probation even if the request came after the six month period.
Under section 8.1(a), the Juvenile Act contemplates terms and con-
ditions attached to the consent decree probation.89 Each judge has his
or her own favorite conditions to be attached to a consent decree or
regular probation. Regular school attendance is a frequent condition,
and some judges spell out the number of unexcused absences that will
result in a probation violation. Restitution to the victim of an offense
is another common condition. In Philadelphia, it is often provided as
a condition of probation that the juvenile refrain from illegal gang
activity. Constitutional arguments loom from this latter provision as it
is difficult to differentiate between association with friends in a neigh-
borhood and hanging with "comer boys" in a gang. Efforts are presently
underway in Philadelphia to establish closer communication among
police, gang control officers, Youth Conservation Corps workers and
the courts to relay this information. Another provision, sometimes im-
posed on juveniles charged with weapon or drug offenses, is a consent
to a search at any time by any police or law enforcement official. This
is actually a waiver of fourth amendment rights in futuro. Although not
yet tested in Pennsylvania, such a clause did survive a court test in
California.90
Because of the flexibility of consent decree probation, and because
it does not result in an adjudication of delinquency, it has found wide
acceptance by the courts, the prosecution, and defense counsel. The
probation supervision has been tighter than was the case with FSS
although the court administration in Philadelphia has said that there
has not been an undue burden placed on the probation officers.9 '
Especially at the pre-trial level, where there are less serious crimes, the
88. Id. § 50-305(d).
89. Id. § 50-305(a).
90. People v. Mason, 5 Cal. 3d 759, 488 P.2d 630, 97 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1971).
91. Interview with Stanley M. Hopson, Deputy Administrator for the Juvenile Branch
of the Family Court Division, in Philadelphia, July 2, 1973.
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consent decree has been the avenue of disposition for a growing
number of cases.
The "determined" (neither a finding of not guilty nor a determina-
tion of delinquency) status has not yet, however, faded into oblivion. It
has been evolving as a less "serious" disposition than consent decree
probation. Defense counsel often ask for a "determination" when
district attorneys are holding out for a consent decree. It has always
been assumed that a "determined" case could be "undetermined" if
there were subsequent offenses or violations of conditions of the
determination, but that question has never been tested in the courts.
Some questions remain since there has never been any statutory au-
thorization for the "determination" procedure.
The experience to date has indicated that section 8.1 provides a
valuable tool. With the increase in serious juvenile crime, it is abso-
lutely necessary to dispose of the lesser offenses more expeditiously
in order to free resources to deal with the more serious delinquent acts.
4. Prohibition of Pre-trial Social Investigation
As practical and helpful as is section 8.1 of the Juvenile Act, section
22 is impractical, inane, and counter-productive. This section provides
that unless there is an admission prior to trial (which seems pro-
cedurally impossible to this writer), or there is a petition to transfer
to adult court, the court cannot order a social study concerning the
child, his family, and his environment prior to a determination that
the child committed the act charged or that he is deprived.92 The
effect of this section is that in those less serious offenses where negotia-
tions for a consent decree or an admission for probation are in order,
all sides are precluded from knowing what makes a juvenile tick and
what his home environment is. It would require trials of dozens upon
dozens of cases that are now expeditiously disposed of. It would delay
treatment and supervision where prompt intercession is vital to the
well-being of the juvenile during a crisis in his life. The social study
does not result in an infringement on any person's rights because there
are no sanctions for failure to cooperate with the investigating proba-
tion officer. Although this provision of the new Juvenile Act has the
potential to wreak havoc with the administration of the juvenile justice
92. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11. § 50-319(a) (Supp. 1973).
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system, it has not done so. This is because defense counsel and the
courts have very wisely ignored and disregarded it and have conducted
pre-trial social investigations just as was done before the Juvenile Act.
A different problem might have prompted the enactment of this sec-
tion. There should be no problem if the judge reviews the full inform-
ation about a juvenile at a pre-trial hearing. However, there could be
prejudice if the judge looks at a juvenile's record before adjudication
at an adjudicatory hearing. This writer not only avoids looking at the
record, but has instructed the court personnel not to even place the
record on the bench so that its thickness or thinness can be observed.
The solution is not to discontinue pre-trial investigations but to pro-
vide some mechanism to insure judicial restraint on this point.
E. Juvenile Hearings
1. General Public Excluded
Section 19(d) of the new Juvenile Act limits the people who may be
present in the hearing room in juvenile cases. It provides:
(d) Except in hearings to declare a person in contempt of court,
the general public shall be excluded from hearings under this
act. Only the parties, their counsel, witnesses, and other persons
accompanying a party for his assistance, and any other persons as
the court finds have a proper interest in the proceeding or in the
work of the court may be admitted by the court. The court may
temporarily exclude the child from the hearing except while
allegations of his delinquency are being heard. 93
For the most part, this provision has iot caused much difficulty. The
general public has not flocked in great numbers to ju'venile proceed-
ings. There has been no objection to student groups or similarly in-
terested parties observing the proceedings. The press has been admitted
without objection on those few occasions- where the media believed
the case merited coverage. The courts have refused, however, to allow
defense counsel to bring a great number of people to the courthouse
in order to "pack" the room and create a particular atmosphere.
The prime issue that has arisen under this section has been with
93. Id. § 50-316(d).
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respect to police officers. In Philadelphia, most parties, except those
actually involved in the case on trial, wait in an adjoining waiting
room. Exceptions have been made for attorneys, probation officers, and
police officers involved in: other cases. The defendants have raised
objections to the presence of officers involved in other cases being
present in the courtroom, saying it is an abuse of discretion for the
court to find that they have a "proper interest" in other proceedings
or the work of the court. Almost all the judges have ruled that the
police officers may remain in the courtroom. The Defender Association
briefed and argued the point unsuccessfully in one Philadelphia case.H
It was argued that the presence of uniformed policemen created a
"vaguely. prosecutorial" atmosphere in the courtroom; that the right
of privacy of the juvenile was violated; and that neither. convenience in
calling cases nor educational benefits to the police justified their
presence. The Commonwealth countered that the Juvenile Act did not
mean to so severely curtail the discretion of the court, and pointed out
that the police are not just members of the general; public.9
It seems noteworthy to this writer that the Juvenile Act allows the
court to admit not only persons with interests in the specific proceed-
ing, but also those with an interest in the "work of the court."96 Espe-
cially with the changes in search and seizure and other similar :pro-
cedures as a result of recent decisions from the Pennsylvania. Supreme
Court, it seems that the police can be materially assisted in their work
by getting as much experience as possible in seeing how the courts are
ruling on such questions. Also, from listening to other juvenile cases,
officers can learn first-hand the .latest facts of gang violence and other
problems facing police in dealing with juveniles. Thus. this writer
believes -that the police are, in the category of those having a vital in-
terest in the work of the court.-
There has been some problem in obtaining appellate review on this
question. The decision to admit police is considered interlocutory. The
defenders have been raising the issue in, a number of cases where
appeals on other issues make it seem likely that the cases will ;eventually
come before the appellate courts .9 T
94., Commonwealth v. Kent, No. 7636 (Pa. C.P. Phila. Co., Sept. 11, 1973).
95. Ii.
96. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-316(d) (Supp. 1973).
97. Interview with Michael L. Levy, former Chief of the Family Court Division of: the
Defender Association of Philadelphia, in Philadelphia, July 16, 1973.
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2. Sidebar Discussions
The Juvenile Act specifically provides that the court may temporarily
exclude the child from the hearing.98 Especially in discussing disposi-
tion, a great deal of conversation takes place among counsel, the court,
probation officers, social workers, etc., out of the range of hearing of
the juvenile or his parents. Much of this is necessary because the
presence of the parents or the juvenile would preclude frank discus-
sion of the family problems and the psychological problems of the
juvenile that are pertinent to his treatment and rehabilitation.
At the same time, the exclusion of the juvenile from discussions in-
volving him creates other problems. The juvenile often feels quite
alien to the system that is determining his future. His lawyer and
probation officer, along with everybody else, are going into the back
room and emerging with a decision that may send him away some
place. The problem is aggravated in the urban areas where a great
many of the defendants are black and the group going into the back
room for discussion is all white.
There is no easy answer to this dilemma. As long as the great social
gaps continue, it will be difficult to create a situation where the
juvenile will feel he has been tried by a system that is not totally
foreign to him,
3. Right to Counsel
Section 20 of the Juvenile Act specifically sets forth that a juvenile
is entitled to counsel "at all stages of any proceedings under this act." 99
This section also provides for free counsel if the juvenile is indigent.100
Of course, this is mandated by the United States Supreme Court de-
cision of In re Gault.101
A voluntary defender is available in all juvenile proceedings in Phila-
delphia, both on pre-trial court lists and for adjudicatory hearings.
Attorneys are not provided at the interviews before probation officers
held in Philadelphia at the Youth Study Center. This is not required
by the Juvenile Act, since this interview is not part of the formal
"proceedings." Under section 6, the proceedings do not begin until the
98. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-316(d) (Supp. 1973).
99. Id. 1 50-317.
100. Id.
101. 387 US. 1 (1967).
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filing of a petition,102 and the "informal adjustment" hearings are held
before the petition is filed.10 3 Private counsel frequently report diffi-
culties in getting to these hearings because they are held so quickly
after the arrest. Also, although parents are supposed to be notified of
a juvenile's apprehension and his whereabouts with all reasonable
speed after a child is taken into custody,10 problems are still reported
in catching up with a juvenile as he moves from the police district to
the Youth Study Center.
Screening of juveniles in order to see if they qualify for the voluntary
defender is cursory prior to the pre-trial hearing stage. The procedure
in Philadelphia at the Youth Study Center is merely to ask the family
if they can afford counsel, without any further probing. Often juveniles
come to the pre-trial hearing or detention hearing without counsel.
Many judges are lenient in examining financial qualifications before
appointing the voluntary defender at the pre-trial hearing in the hopes
that the case can be taken off the list at that level if the voluntary
defender is in the case. If the case cannot be adjusted at the pre-trial
stage a further inquiry into financial qualifications for free counsel is
conducted by the judge. The pre-trial hearing also serves a valuable
function for the Philadelphia defender, who has the juvenile in the
building and can send him to the defender's office for an interview.
Private counsel who are appointed often find great difficulty in con-
tacting their clients and in having their clients come for an interview
before the court date.
Problems also arise if the parents are the complainants, such as in
a runaway or incorrigibility petition. There is a conflict between the
juvenile and his parents. The defender is almost always appointed in
these circumstances, and the parents are rarely assessed the costs of
this representation.
4. Guarantee of Basic Rights
Section 21 of the new Juvenile Act spells out some of the rights
guaranteed juveniles in addition to the right to counsel. This section
spells out the right to introduce evidence, to cross-examine witnesses,
to refuse to testify, and to suppress illegally obtained statements or
102. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-302(3) (Supp. 1973).
103. Id. § 50-304(a).
104. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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evidence. 105 This section adds nothing to existing law, since these
rights are guaranteed under In re Gault,08 In re Winship,10 7 and other
decisions.
One question h as arisen under this section. Section 21 provides: "A
confession validly-made by a child out of court at a time when the child
is under eighteen years of age shall be insufficient to support an
-adjudication of delinquency unless it is corroborated by other evi-
dence."' 0 8 Defense counsel have taken the position that even if inde-
pendent evidence that a crime has been committed is in the record,
the juvenile cannot be tried if the only thing tying him to the crime is
his statement. Prosecutors have taken the position that the instant
language merely restates the corpus delicti principle that a confession
is insufficient to support a conviction unless there is independent evi-
dence that a crime actually was committed. This writer agrees with
this latter position. The section by its title pirports to deal only with
•"basic rights," and the' other rights outlined 'in the section are tradi-
tional adult guarantees rather than new and unique provisions of law.
F. Dispositions
1. Importance. in Juvenile Proceedings.
'Dispositions have long been coisidered the "Name of the Game" in
juvenile court. Although the distinction between probation and
'incarceration does exist in adult court, after the decision has'been made
to- incarcerate, the question becomes more one of. "how long" than
"where." Of course, the, length of the sentence does make a difference
as to whether a convicted adult goes to a state or county institution.
However, there is a far greater range of institutions to which a judge
may commit a juvenile, and, correspondingly, a far greater difference
in the kind of programs in which juveniles may be involved.
There are great variations in the kind of treatment a juvenile re-
ceives at the.different institutions. The range extends from institutions
with manylof the same features as prep schools, such as George Junior
Republic in -the Pittsburgh area' and St. Gabriel's Hall near Philadel-
phia, to what can only be described as a prison, Camp Hill.
105. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-318 (Supp. 1973).
106. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
107. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
108. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-318(b) (Supp. 1973).
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The problem is a particularly acute one for the practitioner who
only occasionally ventures into juvenile court. No reference source
exists which gives any real picture as to the nature of the various
institutions. It is imperative for a lawyer going to a dispositional
hearing to discuss the range of possibilities with a knowledgeable
person. Otherwise, the lawyer will face the situation of one attorney
who felt highly pleased because his client was going to a "camp," not
knowing that "Camp" Hill bears no relationship to a boys' summer
camp.
2. Commitment for Children Under Twelve
Under section 11 of the old Juvenile Court Law'09 the court was
prohibited from committing a child under the age of twelve years to
any institution unless the child had first been on probation. This pro-
vision was the center of a public furor in Philadelphia when two boys,
aged ten and eleven, participated in the imprisonment, torture, and
sexual abuse of an elderly woman. This provision is nowhere to be
found in the new Juvenile Act, and there is now no legal barrier to
committing a delinquent child of any age. The practical problem does
exist of finding an appropriate institution.
3. Prohibition of Commitment of Deprived Child to Institution
with Delinquent Children
Although one part of section 11 of the old Juvenile Court Law1 0
did not find its way into the new Juvenile Act, another did. This is the
clause which prohibits the commitment of deprived children to an
institution designed for the benefit of delinquent children unless the
child is delinquent as well as deprived. This appears as section 24(b)
of the new Juvenile Act."'
This is another section that looks better on paper than it works out
in practice. The problem is that there is no hard and ,fast distinction
between a delinquent child and a deprived child. Most juveniles with
problems are a little delinquent and a little deprived at the same time.
It is sometimes hard to determine the difference between a child who
is delinquent because "of habitual disobedience of the reasonable and
109. Act of June 2, 1933, Pa. P.L. 1433, § 11.
110. Id.
111. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-321(b) (Supp. 1973).
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lawful commands of his parent" 11 2 and a child who is deprived because
he "is without proper parental care."113
.For many children the line is clear. For a large group of children in
the middle, however, the question should not be whether the child is
delinquent or deprived, but what institution suits him best; sometimes
more important, what institution can take him without a six month
wait to get in.
As is the case with many provisions of the law that do not work,
resourceful judges and attorneys find their way around them. In this
case, after hearing the testimony which would establish a delinquent
act, the judge merely reserves final adjudication until the word is in
from the institutions to which referrals are made. If the juvenile is
accepted at an institution designated for "deprived" children, the de-
linquency matter is determined and he is adjudged deprived. If, on
the other hand, the institutions for "deprived" children either will
not accept the juvenile or are full, the judge then makes the de-
termination of delinquency and sends the juvenile to a so-called "de-
linquent" institution.
4. Length of Commitments
Section 26 of the new Juvenile Act imposes new restrictions upon
the length of commitments. The maximum under the Juvenile Act is
now the maximum sentence for the offense under the Penal Code, or
three years, whichever is less.' 14 The time period can be extended for
a similar period of time after hearing, if that seems to be in the best
interests of all concerned." 5 Thus it is still possible for a juvenile to
receive double the maximum sentence that could be imposed if he
were an adult.
At the same time, section 26 requires the committing court to review
each commitment every six months and to hold a dispositional review
hearing at least once a year.116 Many institutions have done an excellent
job in providing the court with frequent, comprehensive reports on
the status of juveniles committed to them. The court is thus able to
provide input based on its contact with the juvenile. This often can
112. Id. § 50-102(2)(ii).
113. Id. § 50-102(4)(i).
114. Id. § 50-323.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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be helpful, since the judge has seen what happens to the juvenile when
outside the restricted institutional setting. It is often helpful to the
court in those situations when the juvenile comes back to court, either
for discharge, for a runaway, or a subsequent crime committed on
weekend pass. Many other institutions fail to respond to repeated
inquiries by the court for status reports. Unfortunately, the new pro-
vision for review117 does not change things very much, at least with
respect to the six-month review. Those institutions which report fre-
quently (Glen Mills is one example) have no need for a mandated
review-the institution is on top of the problem. Those institutions
that have been lax in providing information to the court (Camp Hill
has caused some problems for this writer, but changes are being made)
are not much bothered by the requirement, since their six-month
report to the court is cursory and not much help at all. Since the new
Juvenile Act has been read to apply only to commitments made after
its effective date in February of 1973, it is too soon to see what will
happen with the one-year formal reviews.
Another problem between the courts and institutions has arisen that
is not really touched by the new Juvenile Act. A number of institutions
grant weekend passes and then extended leaves without contacting the
court. Often, from the judge's view of the crime committed, it does not
appear that a two or three month stay in an institution will be sufficient
for rehabilitation, no matter how well the juvenile does in that in-
stitution. Also, sometimes there are gang pressures on the street that
make it advisable to keep the juvenile completely away from his home
"turf' for several months. Judges have recently been inserting pro-
visions such as "no weekend passes without order of court," and most
institutions have been honoring these requests. Changes have been
made to keep the courts better apprised as to proposed extended
leaves.
A major step toward better court-institution relations has occurred
in Philadelphia with the expansion of Community Related Institu-
tional Probation. Now a Philadelphia probation officer begins to work
with every juvenile who has been committed to one of 23 different
institutions as soon as he or she is committed. Not only is this most
effective in reintegration of the juvenile into his community, but these
probation officers are a valued aid to the court in keeping the judges
posted on developments with juveniles they commit.
117. Id.
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5. "Camp Hill" Question
The one issue involving the new Juvenile Act that has reached the
appellate courts is the issue as to whether it prohibits the commitment
of a juvenile who has been adjudged delinquent to. the State Correc-
tional Institution at Camp Hill, which is the only maximum security
institution that has been serving juveniles..
The question arose following enactment of section 27 of the Juvenile
Act, which provides in part:
A child shall not be committed or transferred to a penal insti-
tution or other facility used primarily for the execution of sen-
tences of adults convicted of a crime, unless there is no other
appropriate facility available, in which case the child shall be
kept separate and apart from such adults at all times. 118
"Child" is defined as an individual under the age of eighteen or under
the age of twenty-one who committed an act of delinquency before
reaching the age of eighteen.119
In addition to receiving juveniles, Camp Hill also receives persons
between the ages of fifteen and twenty-one convicted of adult crimes
who have not previously been sentenced to a penitentiary or state
prison. They are committed there, in lieu of sentence,, for- an in-
definite term.12 0 Some young adults sentenced to a fixed term are
transferred to Camp Hill administratively.' 21
As of April 5, 1973, 490 of the Camp Hill total population of 849,
or 58 per cent, were committed by the criminal courts. 22 The classi-
fication.and separation of residents at Camp Hill was not done by age,
but rather by needs, background, degree of hostility, etc. Superintend-
ent Ernest S. Patton did this because in his view, which is shared by
this writer, there are many more significant differences among young
men between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one (or even twenty-five)
than whether or not they happen to have passed. their eighteenth birth-
day, or whether they passed through the juvenile court system or the
adult court system.128
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania passed on this matter in an
opinion written by Judge William F. Cercone, and filed on. September
118. lii. § 50-324(a).
119. Id. § 50-102(1).
120. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 483 (1964).
121. In re Curtis Stokes, No. 172110 (Pa. C.P. Phila. Co., May 2, 1973).
122. Id.
123. Id.
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19, 1973, in'the cases of In re Parker, and Commonwealth ex rel.
Parker v. Patton. 24
In its opinion, the court said that Camp Hill played a dual role,
one good and one bad. The court pointed to the rehabilitative pro-
grams at Camp Hill as the good and the mingling of juveniles and
adults convicted of crime as the bad. It put the blame on the legislature
for failing to establish and fund separate institutions for juveniles and
adults which each carry out thesame kind of rehabilitative programs.
!The court .said it was clear that in Pennsylvania there were no more
appropriate facilities for certain juveniles than Camp Hill. In order
to meet the requirements of section 27, the court directed the Camp
Hill authorities to provide separate facilities for the needs of juvenile
delinquents and adult criminals, or to provide for the separate use of
the same facilities "avoiding at all times any intermingling of the two
groups."'12 The separation was ordered for all portions of the daily
life of the juveniles, including sleeping, resting, recreation and aca-
demic and vocational training.
The superior court did not directly address itself to a point that was
considered determinative by a Philadelphia court.
In a case involving the same issue, Family Court Administrative
Judge Frank J. Montemuro, Jr., upheld commitments to Camp Hill
without ordering segregation' of juveniles from adults. 126 The reason-
ing was that Camp Hill is not primarily used for the execution of
sentences of:adults convicted of a crime, since its primary purpose is
rehabilitation and reform rather than, mere execution of sentences.
Judge Montemuro pointed to section 25(4) of the Juvenile Act, which
specifically permits the commitment of a child to a special facility for
children operated by the ,Department of Justice. Since there is only one
such facility, Camp Hill, Judge Montemuro concluded that the legis-
lature must have been aware of this and therefore contemplated con-
tinued use of Camp Hill and did not consider it a penal institution
for the execution of sentences but rather a reformatory. 27
In dealing with this question, the superior coudrt merely said,
"...we could argue needlessly as to whether Camp Hill is pri-
marily a penal institution or a rehabilitation facility.' 128 Whether
124. Nos. 731 & 949 (Pa. Super. Ct., Oct. 14, 1973) (consolidated for appeal).
125. Id.
126. In re Curtis Stokes, No. 172110 (Pa. C.P. Phila. Co., May 2, 1973).
127. Id.
128. Id.
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needless or not, it is expected that this will be argued again when
this matter comes before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
The problems of this entire situation merely accentuate the lack
of facilities in the Commonwealth for dealing with juveniles with
certain specific needs. No one questions the need for a secure institu-
tion for juveniles. Despite the trend toward "open" settings, no one
modality works for everybody.
The difficulty this writer foresees is that the legislature for many
years to come will fail to allocate sufficient funds for a separate, secure
facility for juveniles, and an order of court forcing Camp Hill to
operate two separate institutions in one facility will make that a
worse, not better, institution for the rehabilitation of juveniles.
G. Post-Trial Proceedings
1. Provisions for Rehearing
Under section 15 of the old Juvenile Court law, 120 if a child was com-
mitted he had an absolute right to a rehearing. He could not only
appeal for errors of law or fact, but could also allege that the order
was "improvidently or inadvertently made."180 At the rehearing either
side could present testimony, although the Commonwealth could rely
upon the record made at the original trial.181
There is no provision for such a rehearing in the new Juvenile Act.
As a practical matter, the court can still allow this rehearing as a
matter of discretion, with or without statutory authority, absent op-
position from the district attorney. In Philadelphia, it can be antici-
.pated that if a judge thinks there are some compelling reasons for a
rehearing, in most instances the Commonwealth would go along with
that decision.
2. Post-Trial Motions
Under section 15 of the old law, there was a specific provision for
appeals to the superior court from final orders after rehearings. 182 A
question has arisen as to whether post-trial motions in arrest of judg-
129. Act of June 2, 1933, Pa. P.L. 1433, § 15.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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ment or for a new trial are necessary before an appeal can be filed to
the superior court. The general view is that they probably are not,
since there is no provision in the Juvenile Act for such motions, but
it is a good idea to file and argue them anyway. There is the possibility
that a motion in arrest of judgment or for a new trial will be granted
by the trial judge himself; moreover, it is a courtesy to the court to
advise the judge of the issues involved before an appeal is taken.
III. CONCLUSION
The promulgation of a major new act carries with it theoretical con-
notations of definitiveness and rigidity. Now we have the law. In
practice, no one yet has learned how to write legislation not subject
to different interpretations by creative lawyers. Furthermore, success-
ful changes in the law are not usually dictated by outsiders but are
evolved by the judges and lawyers working every day in the field.
The same is true with respect to the new Juvenile Act. The changes
are not really that sweeping. Some new concepts are very effective,
others unreal and impractical. Now that the words are on paper, the
real job has begun. That job must be done by judges and lawyers all
working to establish a framework within the printed word that suc-
cessfully deals with the problems of the people that come to the bar
of the court. However, if post-trial motions are to be filed, the judge
must be asked to defer disposition. Otherwise, it is likely that the ap-
peal time will start to run from the date of the disposition and the
right to appeal to the superior court might be lost before appeal.
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